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INTRODUCTION
As they age, most academics do not wear out, but rust out or suffer
from a hardening of the conceptual categories. Not so with Marshall Shapo,
the Frederic P. Vose Professor at Northwestern University School of Law,
whose An Injury Law Constitution is the culmination of a lifetime quest for
justice through tort regimes.1 In this book, Shapo demonstrates by clear and
convincing evidence that so-called tort reform is not just about torts, but is
a sociocultural debate over the parameters of a broader constitutive injury
law that is functionally equivalent to constitutional law. His singular
contribution is the insight that constitutive injury law is a cultural mirror
† I draw my title in part from Alvin W. Gouldner, Anti-Minotaur: The Myth of a Value-Free
Sociology, 9 SOC. PROBS. 199 (1962), criticizing sociologists of his day for their detached value
neutrality and setting the stage for value-engaged research. I appreciate the editorial suggestions of Tom
Galligan, Tom Koenig, Chryss Knowles, and Gabe Teinenbaum. Finally, I would like to thank my
editors at the Northwestern University Law Review for their editorial suggestions, particularly Thomas
Kayes, Laura Kolesar Gura, Elizabeth Uzelac, and Jeff VanDam.

Thomas F. Lambert Jr. Professor of Law & Co-Director of the Intellectual Property Law
Concentration, Suffolk University Law School.
1
Professor Shapo has praised the extraordinary career of Page Keeton and how his four decades of
scholarship reflected a concern for justice as well as practical administration. Marshall S. Shapo, Page
Keeton and the Revolution in Products Law: Toward Stability, a Quest for Fairness, 52 TEX. L. REV.
1065, 1065 (1974). As with Keeton, it would take a novelist to capture the full measure of Marshall
Shapo the man, his mind, and his contribution to torts scholarship.
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that reflects the continual societal struggle over the degree to which safety
should be subordinated to the autonomy of the injurer.
When Marshall Shapo was a novice law professor teaching torts at the
University of Texas Law School nearly a half century ago, no one would
have imagined that U.S. presidential campaigns would feature tort law.
Today, Republican leaders know that tort reform can always raise money
from corporations and energize the conservative base—as effective as
pitching lamb chops towards a pack of wolves. President George H.W.
Bush charged that then-Governor Bill Clinton’s campaign was “backed by
practically every trial lawyer who ever wore a tasseled loafer.”2 His son,
President George W. Bush, aggressively called for curbing frivolous
lawsuits against medical providers in his 2007 State of the Union Address.
Bush highlighted tort reform in several of his other State of the Union
Addresses as well.3 Mitt Romney, too, campaigned on tort reform:
Another burden on our economic future is our out-of-control tort system. Last
year, U.S. corporations spent more money on tort claims than they did on
R&D. If innovation is the key to our long term leadership, then some tort
lawyers are cashing out our country’s future. . . . No thanks, America needs
national tort reform.4

Apart from its fundraising effectiveness, a phony crisis is like nothing
else when it comes to camouflaging the real agenda in erecting new
defenses and immunities to shield the corporate injuring lobby.5 If, as
Shapo argues, tort law is a cultural mirror,6 what do caps on justice say
about the way American society treats its mothers and grandmothers?7
2

Lynn Van Matre, Bush Wrongly Hassles the Tassel, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 28, 1992, § 5, at 1
(mentioning “sharp lawyers” and “crazy lawsuits” in his 1992 acceptance speech at the Republican
National Convention).
3
George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan. 23, 2007), in WASH. POST, Jan. 24, 2007, at
A16; see also George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan. 31, 2006), in N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1,
2006, at A18; George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Feb. 2, 2005), in N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2005,
at A22; George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan. 28, 2003), in N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2003, at
A12.
4
Justin Hart, Excerpts from Governor Mitt Romney’s Remarks at the Detroit Economic Club, MITT
ROMNEY CENT. (Feb. 7, 2007, 11:22 AM), http://mittromneycentral.com/2007/02/07/excerpts-fromgovernor-mitt-romneys-remarks-at-the-detroit-economic-club/.
5
See, e.g., Michael L. Rustad, Unraveling Punitive Damages: Current Data and Further Inquiry,
1998 WIS. L. REV. 15 (reviewing all empirical studies on punitive damages); see generally THOMAS H.
KOENIG & MICHAEL L. RUSTAD, IN DEFENSE OF TORT LAW (2001) (summarizing research on tort
reform that demonstrates that it is based upon a foundation of anecdote and urban tort myths rather than
systematic empirical data).
6
See, e.g., MARSHALL S. SHAPO, TORT LAW AND CULTURE (2003).
7
“Proposals to cap noneconomic damages in nursing home cases are aimed at reducing insurance
premiums. Tort reformers argue that nursing home lawsuits are ‘forcing many doctors to quit serving
patients in nursing homes and draining resources that should be used to provide quality patient care to
nursing home residents.’ Nursing home lawsuits are also blamed for doctors having difficulties
‘obtaining or renewing their medical liability insurance.’” Michael L. Rustad, Heart of Stone: What Is
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What does it say about our society’s family values when judges cap the
noneconomic damages awarded to a child born deformed because of a
prenatal injury inflicted by a negligent doctor? What does it say about the
inner life of our Republic that we cap noneconomic damages at $250,000
for elderly nursing home patients who have suffered excruciating pain from
neglected pressure sores or who have been sexually assaulted by minimum
wage caretakers?8
Shapo’s An Injury Law Constitution introduces the concept of an
“injury law constitution” to describe the distinctive values embodied by
American tort law, with its emphasis on responsibility and prevention of
injuries. Constitutive injury law can be described as our civil religion that
levels abuses of power, whether it is the haughty power of the oil industry
responsible for the gusher in the Gulf or feral governmental officials that
spy on or even torture U.S. citizens.
I. AN INJURY LAW CONSTITUTION IN A NUTSHELL
Shapo’s thesis is that distinctive and virile bodies of law have evolved
for determining responsibility for injuries and the prevention of injuries.
These legal institutions have some of the qualities of a constitution—a
fundamental set of legal and moral principles that govern relations between
human persons, corporations, and governments.9 His work counters the
simplistic arguments of corporate-funded tort reformers who claim that
America’s civil justice system is driving our economy into a death spiral
through jackpot justice awards to greedy plaintiffs and their amoral trial
attorneys. Drawing upon forty-six years of torts scholarship and teaching,
Shapo demonstrates how injury law reflects our most important cultural
values in curbing corporate, governmental, and individual bullies, or
reckless companies that play roulette by trading safety for profits.10
Chapter One is a treasure trove of constitutional history that is critical
to Shapo’s thesis that injury law is fundamental enough to be the functional
equivalent of constitutional law. As my former professor, Tom Lambert,
reminds us, “History is not archeology: it is not digging in dust pits; it is
‘relighting the towers of Troy to watch them burn.’ History has an office. It

Revealed About the Attitude of Compassionate Conservatives Toward Nursing Home Practices, Tort
Reform, and Noneconomic Damages, 35 N.M. L. REV. 337, 369 (2005) (alterations and footnotes
omitted) (quoting Medical Liability in Long Term Care: Is Escalating Litigation a Threat to Quality
and Access?: Hearing Before the Spec. S. Comm. on Aging, 108th Cong. 1–2 (2004) (statement of Sen.
Larry Craig)).
8
Id. at 345, 371 & n.237.
9
See MARSHALL S. SHAPO, AN INJURY LAW CONSTITUTION 1 (2012).
10
See, e.g., SHAPO, supra note 6; see also ABA SPECIAL COMM. ON THE TORT LIAB. SYS.,
TOWARDS A JURISPRUDENCE OF INJURY: THE CONTINUING CREATION OF A SYSTEM OF SUBSTANTIVE
JUSTICE IN AMERICAN TORT LAW (Marshall S. Shapo, Reporter, 1984).
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is to turn on the lights—to help us understand where we are and how we
got there . . . .”11
Shapo specifically illuminates the lengthy path of injury law through
his account of how the Athenian leader Solon (sixth century B.C.)
abolished the use of human beings as collateral to secure loans, a business
practice recognized as legitimate under the primitive constitutionalism of
Draco.12 Constitutionalism in Aristotle’s day contained consumer
protections such as specific rules against adulterating commodities.13 Shapo
next traces how the natural rights idea took root at Runnymede and was
later exported into the American colonies. Originally, the principal concern
was how to constrain governmental abuses of power, but civil law
gradually expanded its scope to cover private oppressions.14 Many of the
American colonies, for example, later enacted state constitutions
embodying what today would be tort rights such as the right to file suit for
libel or to be free of “unreasonable searches and seizures,” which
prefigured § 1983 governmental torts.15
Shapo acknowledges that injury laws do not have “the binding status
of the U.S. Constitution, nor do they provide an authoritative basis for
courts to invalidate common law rules or statutes.”16 The constitutive tort
law, he argues, “provides a normative framework, and a set of moral
standards, by which we measure existing and proposed rules for society’s
response to injuries.”17 Shapo contends that countries in the European Union
are just in the formative stage of evolving their own injury constitution,
“developed in the rulings of the European Court of Human Rights.”18
In Chapter Two, Shapo argues that “our modern law of injuries
manifests an effort on the part of judges and legislators to check the use,
including misuse and abuse, of power.”19 Shapo provides many effective
examples of judicial decisions infused with morality, thus creating a
constitutional dimension. In general, the 1960s and 1970s was a period of
torts expansionism when courts recognized innovative rights and remedies
that were closely akin to establishing new constitutional rights.20 Courts
11

Thomas F. Lambert, Jr., Editorial, Principles, Persuasions, and Primrose Propaganda,
19 NACCA L.J. 25, 26 (1957).
12
SHAPO, supra note 9, at 2–3.
13
Id. at 4.
14
See id. at 5.
15
Id. at 9.
16
Id. at 1.
17
Id.
18
Id. at 15 (internal quotation mark omitted).
19
Id. at 25.
20
In 1968 the California Supreme Court abolished the harsh landowner categories of the trespasser,
licensee, and invitee in favor of a standard of reasonable care in Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561
(Cal. 1968). The first appellate case to uphold a punitive damages award in a products liability case was
decided in 1967. See Toole v. Richardson-Merrell Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (Ct. App. 1967) (affirming an
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often served as a shield against overbearing abuses of power such as in
Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel, Inc.,21 where the Texas Supreme Court
upheld a tort remedy in favor of an African-American mathematician
denied restaurant service solely because of his race.
By the time Shapo began his teaching career at Texas, torts was at its
tipping point as court after court ruled that the quest for substantive justice
should trump long-established “pro-defendant tort defenses and
immunities.”22 By the 1970s, many states had tempered the harsh effects of
statutes of limitations by developing discovery rules that allowed tolling
where the injury did not manifest for decades.23 The tort tide turned against
anti-plaintiff familial, charitable, and governmental immunities and other
regressive defenses such as assumption of risk and contributory negligence
that had long prevented tort victims from obtaining redress.24
Shapo’s formative years as a torts professor also began at the height of
a progressive era of liberalized safety regulations, another leg of Shapo’s
constitutive injury law.25 During the 1960s and 1970s, new federal statutes,
in alliance with the reinterpretations of the common law of torts,
aggressively curbed abuses of power. Shapo notes: “The number of statutes
with leveling tendencies is legion. In the injury law field, a very short list
includes not only the Occupational Safety and Health Act, but the
Americans with Disabilities Act and various sections of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.”26
Congress passed the Federal Tort Claims Act in 1946, but
governmental liability for abuses of power did not reach its takeoff point
until a series of expansive court decisions in the late 1960s and early
1970s.27 Congress enacted the Consumer Product Safety Act in 1972,
which invested the Consumer Product Safety Commission with the power
to establish product safety standards to protect consumers from

award of punitive damages against a pharmaceutical company for the fraudulent marketing of the anticholesterol drug MER/29). A year later, the Eighth Circuit upheld the concept of crashworthiness in
Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968). In 1967, the California Supreme Court
ruled for the first time that an insured has a right to sue an insurance company for its bad faith refusal to
settle a claim. Crisci v. Sec. Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173 (Cal. 1967). The tort of bad faith failure to settle
insurance cases was developed further in Fletcher v. Western National Life Insurance Co., 89 Cal. Rptr.
78 (Ct. App. 1970).
21
424 S.W.2d 627 (Tex. 1967).
22
KOENIG & RUSTAD, supra note 5, at 52 (explaining how the law of comparative negligence was
displacing the harsh and discredited doctrine of contributory negligence).
23
Id. at 53.
24
Id. at 53–55.
25
SHAPO, supra note 9, at 33.
26
Id. at 35.
27
See id. at 32–33.
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unreasonably dangerous products.28 This was also the heyday for
constitutional torts to redress police misconduct.29
In Chapter Three, Shapo demonstrates that injury law, meaning rules
for the responsibility for injuries and prevention of injuries, is the chief
guardian for protecting rights. The seeds for this chapter were planted more
than four decades ago in an essay Shapo wrote about the role of torts in
countering abuses of power.30 His prediction was that “[t]he Torts of the
future will stress to an even greater degree, in Dean Green’s felicitous
phrase, that tort law is very much public law.”31 Shapo’s 1970 article called
for “public policy-based torts that would check the private party much like
constitutional law cases of that era checked abuses of government power.”32
Fast forward forty-two years, and Shapo has published a torts tour de force
that demonstrates with convincing clarity that injury law has begun to take
on the qualities of a constitution—a powerful mechanism to check
individual, governmental, and corporate bullies.33
Shapo explains how the early common law vindicated personal
security and the right to enjoy real property, remedies that remain part of
the bricks and mortar of intentional torts. Torts were largely a closed
system that denied recovery if an injury could not fit comfortably within an
“existing and recognized writ.”34 By the mid-eighteenth century, AngloAmerican torts vindicated reputational interests (defamation), enjoined
harmful land uses (nuisance), and made sellers accountable for knowingly
selling unmerchantable wares (misrepresentation).35
Injury law evolved when it shed the shackles of the writ period to
address emergent forms of oppression.36 Shapo illustrates evolving injury
rights by the development of the doctrine of informed consent in medical
liability cases. Benjamin Cardozo prefigured the doctrine of informed
consent in a 1914 case in which he wrote about, in Shapo’s words, “self-

28

“The Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) was created in 1972 when Congress passed
the Consumer Product Safety Act to protect the public ‘against unreasonable risks of injuries associated
with consumer products.’” Michele Boyer, Consumer Product Safety Commission CPSC History, US
RECALL NEWS (May 30, 2008), http://www.usrecallnews.com/2008/05/us-consumer-product-safetycommission-cpsc.html (quoting Contact Information, U.S. CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY COMMISSION,
http://www.cpsc.gov/en/About-CPSC/Contact-Information/ (last visited May 24, 2013)).
29
See, e.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961) (allowing cause of action against police
officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
30
Marshall S. Shapo, Changing Frontiers in Torts: Vistas for the 70’s, 22 STAN. L. REV. 330, 334
(1970).
31
Id. at 334–35.
32
Michael L. Rustad, Torts as Public Wrongs, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 433, 541–42 (2011).
33
See SHAPO, supra note 9.
34
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 6, at 28 (W. Page Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984).
35
Id. § 3, at 19.
36
See SHAPO, supra note 9, at 38.

1364

107:1359 (2013)

The Myth of a Value-Free Injury Law

determination concerning one’s own body.”37 Courts began to recognize
that patients had a right of informed consent in medical malpractice
beginning with the 1957 case of Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. University
Board of Trustees.38
Tom Lambert often stated, “Harm is the tort signature.”39 Another
major theme in this chapter is how American culture influences what is
regarded as legally cognizable harm. Shapo describes how American
individualism runs through injury law in at least three aspects:
“[(1)] individualization of justice, [(2)] the question of how much to allow
for individual aspects of injurers’ ability and competence, and [(3)] the
question of how the law should deal with particular elements of the
physical and mental makeup of injury victims.”40 As a result, “plaintiffs in
mass torts litigation have enjoyed little success in convincing courts to
recognize collective liability theories such as market share, enterprise
liability, civil conspiracy and concert of action.”41 Courts continue to
struggle with mass torts and disasters that do not mesh well with tort’s
traditional model of individuated justice.42 Tort reformers have successfully
deployed the rhetoric of individual responsibility to justify limitations on
tort damages.43 Shapo observes that courts are especially hesitant to
recognize emotional harms under the tort system. The negligent infliction
of emotional distress, for example, is a tort that is often deployed but rarely
successful because of high legal thresholds.44
Chapter Four examines how courts determine the radius of the risk and
the sources of risk, the role of statistical analysis, the behavioral causes of
injuries, harms not recognized as injuries, and problems of calculating
loss.45 Torts are individualized, while alternative compensation systems
such as Social Security disability payments and workers’ compensation
injuries are scheduled with one-size-fits-all solutions.46 Shapo contrasts the
common law of torts with income maintenance under workers’
compensation, which he describes as “a kind of halfway house between tort
37

Id. at 37 (discussing Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914)).
317 P.2d 170, 181 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957) (holding that jury instructions were improper on the
issue of whether the patient was properly informed of the risks of a procedure).
39
Thomas F. Lambert, Jr., Suing for Safety, TRIAL, Nov. 1983, at 48, 48.
40
See SHAPO, supra note 9, at 56.
41
Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Reforming Public Interest Tort Law to Redress Public
Health Epidemics, 14 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 331, 353 (2011).
42
Courts have refused to extend market share or enterprise liability to products lacking fungibility.
See, e.g., Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 750 N.E.2d 1055, 1068 (N.Y. 2001) (refusing to extend
market share to the distribution of handguns); In re N.Y. State Silicone Breast Implant Litig.,
631 N.Y.S.2d 491 (Sup. Ct. 1995) (refusing to expand market share to silicone breast implants).
43
See SHAPO, supra note 9, at 54.
44
See id. at 77.
45
Id. at 70–84.
46
See id.
38
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law, which before workers’ compensation became law often denied
recovery to injured workers because of their own risky conduct, and fulldress social legislation.”47 He places torts along an injury law spectrum that
also includes federal safety statutes such as the Food Drug and Cosmetic
Act, the Occupational Safety and Health Act, and the National Traffic and
Motor Vehicle Safety Act.
Chapter Four is also a fascinating and important study of legally
recognized injuries, which are the building blocks for the creation of rights.
This chapter identifies the sources of risk that lead to various kinds of harm
by presenting empirical studies of American injury rates.48 Preventable
injuries are responsible for billions of dollars in lost productivity as well as
countless deaths.
Chapter Five examines the structural aspects of the legal system that
make American injury law conflict-habituated terrain. Constitutive tort law
is a jagged terrain reflecting an often-conflicting relationship between the
federal structure of government, common law courts, and state legislatures.
Courts use “no duty” or “limited duty” rules to keep the lid on expansive
tort rights. For example, Shapo notes that airline defendants argue that the
lawsuits filed by survivors of September 11th are “stretching their duty too
far to hold them responsible for the dastardly acts of the terrorists.”49 This
chapter also compares the roles of courts and legislatures and addresses the
problem of preemption.50 Finally, Shapo addresses the problem of how
legal mechanisms cope with modern issues such as scientific uncertainty.51
Courts continue to have difficulties with latent injury cases, such as where
the inhalation and ingestion of asbestos cause an immediate subclinical
injury to lung tissue but the symptoms do not become manifest until
decades later.52
Shapo begins Chapter Six with a doctrinal analysis of the three
paradigmatic branches of tort law—intentionality, negligence, and strict
liability for both activities and defective products. Strict liability was once
the esoteric and delimited province of ultrahazardous activities or injuries
caused by harboring wild animals. But this branch of tort law took off in
1965 when the American Law Institute (ALI) published Section 519 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, which adopted strict liability for abnormally
dangerous activities. In 1965, the ALI also published Section 402A, strict

47

Id. at 67.
See id. at 73–74.
49
Id. at 89–90.
50
Id. at 94.
51
Id. at 94–95.
52
See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. J.H. France Refractories Co., 626 A.2d 502, 507 (Pa. 1993)
(approving a “multiple-trigger theory of liability” for such injuries).
48
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product liability, which swept the torts landscape like a prairie fire.53 Only
two years earlier, the California Supreme Court had handed down
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.,54 the first appellate case to
recognize strict product liability.55 In this chapter, Shapo traces the story of
products liability from Greenman to the failed products liability cases
against big tobacco.56
Chapter Six places the body of injury law in proper perspective by
noting that in “overall monetary terms,” workers’ compensation far
outweighs tort compensation.57 Over the past century plus, Congress and
the states have displaced the scope of tort law by enacting workers’
compensation statutes as well as the Federal Employers’ Liability Act
(FELA). FELA’s core assumption is that “the employer is the most
appropriate party to shoulder the responsibility for workplace injuries.”58
Shapo views alternative compensation statutes in constitutive injury law as
attempts to balance “social justice with cost control.”59 Courts will
sometimes load their “own moral judgment upon the moral foundations
embedded in the workers’ compensation statute itself.”60 In my view, these
courts are pragmatically recognizing that the paltry recovery under
workers’ compensation fails to do justice where the employer has
recklessly endangered its employees.
Much of this chapter enters into the thorny subject of the
indeterminate relationship between the common law of torts and federal
safety regulation. The language of the Consumer Product Safety Act, for
example, employs a technocratic rhetoric rather than a moralistic one.61
Safety regulations play an important role by serving as a proxy for the
53

The rise of strict products liability is emblematic of the modern expansion of plaintiffs’ rights in
tort law. Justice Roger Traynor’s concurring opinion in Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d
436, 440 (Cal. 1944), was the first judicial recognition of strict products liability. A shift from
negligence to strict liability in products liability has swept the nation since the mid-1960s. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965); FRANK J. VANDALL, STRICT LIABILITY: LEGAL
AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 9 (1989).
54
377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
55
The Supreme Court of New Jersey also helped to jump start the field of products liability in its
1960 opinion in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960). In Henningsen,
decided prior to New Jersey’s enactment of UCC Article 2, the court refused to enforce an automobile
manufacturer’s attempt to assert the doctrine of contractual privity and no notice under New Jersey’s
Uniform Sales Act. Justice John Francis, who authored the opinion, reasoned that the dealer and
manufacturer were liable without a showing of negligence, notice, or privity, ruling that “[a]bsence of
agency between the manufacturer and the dealer who makes the ultimate sale is immaterial.” Id. at 84
(upholding liability against both Chrysler and Bloomfield Motors).
56
SHAPO, supra note 9, at 108–11.
57
Id. at 114.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id. at 115.
61
See id. at 118.
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standard of care in private tort litigation.62 The social mechanisms for
Shapo’s injury constitution are often overlapping, and one of the difficult
issues is to establish “boundaries for amounts being left to a choice among
social mechanisms.”63 The uncertain relationship between tort law and
alternative compensation systems could be the subject of a separate treatise.
Chapter Seven returns to a discussion of the mechanics of workers’
compensation and how plaintiffs’ attorneys creatively bypass its exclusivity
bar.64 Workers’ compensation statutes enacted by the states expanded the
number of compensable claims, but the quid pro quo is the exclusivity bar:
the claimants’ surrender of their right to pursue tort claims. One way that
plaintiffs’ attorneys sidestep the exclusivity bar is to allege that an
employee’s injuries were the result of an intentional tort as opposed to
negligence.
Courts and legislatures attempt to strike a fair balance between social
and individual goods; this is the subject of Chapter Eight.65 Here, Shapo
employs cases often used in first-year torts casebooks to illustrate civil
law’s concern with balancing the defendant’s freedom of movement against
the plaintiff’s dignitary interests.66 He uses the spring gun in the Iowa
farmhouse case67 to illustrate the long-standing social norm that landowners
cannot set a trap for trespassers under the privilege of defending property.68
Shapo shares common ground with civil recourse theorists who
contend that tort law has a constitutional status.69 Nevertheless, he departs
from this microlevel perspective in emphasizing tort law’s multiple and
sometimes conflicting objectives. He is also critical of microlevel theorists
whose myopic view of the bilateral relationship between individual
plaintiff and defendant blinds them to the public functions that torts play
for “we the people.”70
Chapter Nine is a roadmap to the “rationales, goals and purposes” of
American injury law. In this chapter, Shapo discusses core principles of
injury law such as vindication, punishment, social justice, uniformity, and
62

See id. at 120.
Id. at 121.
64
Id. at 123.
65
Id. at 179.
66
Id.
67
Id. at 180 (discussing Katko v. Briney, 183 N.W.2d 657 (Iowa 1971)).
68
See Roscoe Pound, Lecture, The Economic Interpretation and the Law of Torts, 53 HARV. L.
REV. 365, 371 (1940) (citing nineteenth-century cases stating that landowners cannot expose trespassers
to serious injury and finding this norm rooted in Coke’s Second Institute and the fifteenth-century Year
Books of Henry VI and Edward IV).
69
See, e.g., John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process and the Right
to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524, 559–611 (2005) (developing a historically
based argument for tort law’s constitutional status); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not
Corrective Justice, 91 GEO. L.J. 695, 754 (2003).
70
SHAPO, supra note 9, at xvi–xvii.
63
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rationality. He contends that federal safety regulations, whose primary goal
is injury prevention, clash with law and economics concepts such as
efficiency, risk–utility and cost–benefit analysis, and clash with the
conceptions of corrective justice prefigured by Aristotle.71
Injury law is a multiparadigmatic field. There are different ways to
interpret the subject.72 It contains an internal contradiction when
simultaneously attempting to advance both the maximization of safety and
cost–benefit analysis. Shapo favors a pluralistic approach—“a selection
process for ideas that recognizes the complexity of the human universe.”73
In Chapter Ten, “Remedies and Sanctions,” Shapo discusses how the
Supreme Court has developed constitutional torts to redress governmental
abuses.74 The Court’s landmark case of Monroe v. Pape75 created “a major
channel into the great bundle of rights provided by the Constitution.”76 But
Shapo also tells the tragic tort story of DeShaney v. Winnebago County
Department of Social Services,77 where the Court closed the courtroom
door to plaintiffs seeking to hold a governmental agency accountable for
the death of a child even though state officials had extensive evidence of
prior circumstances when he was abused by his father.78 The Court ruled in
another case that the police department had no duty to enforce a restraining
order that might have prevented a father from slaying his three daughters.79
These cases reflect the shrinking and waning of governmental tort, which
cuts against the principle that responsible government is answerable
government.
II. DEMYSTIFYING THE SUPREME COURT’S TORT REFORM AGENDA
Throughout his book, Shapo describes the methods by which injury
law institutions evaluate and construct remedies. He observes that “[t]hese
different methods . . . exhibit the brokering that constitution provides
among elements of causal impact, moral responsibility, dispassionate
accounting related to control of risk, and humanitarian concerns.”80 In the
twenty-first century, our injury constitution is, to use Prosser’s memorable
phrase, “a battleground of social theory,”81 featuring attacks on tort law by
much of corporate America and the leadership of the Republican Party.
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81

Id. at 213–16.
See id. at 227.
Id. at 233 (internal quotation mark omitted).
Id. at 125–28 (discussing cases interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006)).
365 U.S. 167 (1961).
SHAPO, supra note 9, at 248.
489 U.S. 189 (1989).
SHAPO, supra note 9, at 250–52.
Id. at 252 (discussing Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005)).
Id. at 242.
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 34, § 3, at 15.
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A year before Shapo started teaching torts at Texas, the Supreme
Court ruled, in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,82 that the constitutional
protection given to speech and the press limits state defamation law. Shapo
dispassionately chronicles the ways that the Supreme Court has placed
“constitutional limitations on defamation suits” since that landmark
decision.83 In 1967, the Court continued its constitutionalization of tort law
in its Time, Inc. v. Hill decision, holding that privacy is subject to the First
Amendment.84 The Court also delimited tort remedies in its interpretation
of maritime law. In East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval
Inc.,85 the Court held that a tort claimant could recover for products liability
in admiralty even though it could not recover for the physical damage a
defective product causes to itself. The Court recognized strict liability and
drew upon the common law in incorporating negligence into general
maritime law.86 The Court’s distinction between injury to “the product
itself” and “other property” is part of a continuing struggle to define the
parameters of injury law.87
The Supreme Court is now engaged in a concerted project to downsize
constitutive injury law. Through a review of a variety of decisions, Shapo
illustrates the Court’s attempts to hold the lid on injury rights by closing the
door to claims or limiting remedies. For example, in Chapter Four, he
discusses how the Supreme Court denied recovery to construction workers
whose employer recklessly exposed them to asbestos fibers without
protection over an extended period.88 He tells the story of Michael Buckley,
who worked for Metro-North Railroad as a pipe fitter, repairing pipes in the
steam tunnels beneath Grand Central Station. For a three-year period,
Buckley and his coworkers were exposed to asbestos dust for
approximately an hour a day. During that time, the workers would be
covered with asbestos dust from working with insulation. It was not until
1987 that the workers received “asbestos awareness” training.89 Michael
and his coworkers were dubbed the “[S]nowmen of Grand Central”

82

376 U.S. 254 (1964).
SHAPO, supra note 9, at 247.
84
385 U.S. 374, 387–88 (1967) (holding that the constitutional protections for speech and press
preclude the application of the New York right-to-privacy statute to redress false reports of matters of
public interest in the absence of proof that the defendant published the report with knowledge of its
falsity or in reckless disregard of the truth); see also Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46
(1988) (concluding that public figures and public officials may not recover for the tort of the intentional
infliction of emotional distress absent proof that the publication contains a false statement of fact made
with actual malice).
85
476 U.S. 858, 865 (1986).
86
Id. at 868.
87
Id. at 868–70.
88
Metro-N. Commuter R.R. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424 (1997).
89
Id. at 427.
83
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because they would come out of the railroad tunnels each day “covered
head to toe with white powder.”90
The Supreme Court held that that the massive, unprotected exposure to
asbestos that these workers endured did not constitute compensable harm
under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act. Shapo believes that the Court
denied recovery because a negligent infliction claim in this latent injury
case would have created the “potential for a flood” of litigation.91 He takes
no stand as to whether the Snowmen of Grand Central case, which denied
even the rudimentary remedy of medical monitoring, was antithetical to a
humane injury constitution. Courts deciding recent toxic torts cases have
been influenced by the Court’s disapproval of medical monitoring damages
in Metro-North.92
Shapo misses an opportunity to evaluate the Court’s new institutional
role as judicial tort reformer and what this signals for the future of
constitutive injury law.93 It is difficult to understand why the Court should
systematically undermine punitive damages, which has been a purely state
law remedy for more than two hundred years.94 Shapo adopts a valueneutral stance as to whether the Supreme Court’s federal takeover of this
state law remedy threatens constitutive injury law. He never connects the
dots between the Court’s newly minted role as “injury law guardian”95 and
corporate America’s campaign to downsize tort law’s remedies in products
liability, medical malpractice, and employee’s rights.
Another shortcoming of the book is that it is U.S. centric, assuming
that our legal system is used by all advanced industrial societies.96 Shapo’s
passing observation is that a constitutive tort law has parallels in the United
Kingdom and Italy.97 In fact, the European Union’s harmonized system of
consumer protection and product safety is a far more developed injury
90

Buckley v. Metro-N. Commuter R.R., 79 F.3d 1337, 1340 (2d Cir. 1996).
SHAPO, supra note 9, at 77.
92
See, e.g., Rhodes v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 657 F. Supp. 2d 751, 774 (S.D. W. Va.
2009) (expressing doubts that an increased risk of harm is a cognizable injury).
93
Tom Galligan comprehensively critiques Supreme Court tort reform developments such as the
Court’s Supremacy Clause-based incursions on state tort law in preemption cases and Fourteenth
Amendment limitations on punitive damages recovery. Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., U.S. Supreme Court
Tort Reform: Limiting State Power to Articulate and Develop Tort Law—Defamation, Preemption, and
Punitive Damages, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1189 (2006).
94
Shapo thoroughly discusses how the Court has gradually turned the screws on punitive damages
in a series of cases beginning with Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415 (1994). See SHAPO, supra
note 9, at 256–62.
95
Here, I am comparing the Court’s jurisprudence to Plato’s antidemocratic work, The Republic,
which conceives of philosopher-king overseers who apprehend truth and justice through a study of
forms. See Michael L. Rustad, Happy No More: Federalism Derailed by the Court that Would Be King
of Punitive Damages, 64 MD. L. REV. 461, 465 (2005).
96
To his credit, Shapo discusses British constitutionalism as well a recent case from the European
Court of Human Rights. SHAPO, supra note 9, at 15–18.
97
Id. at 12–22.
91
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constitution than America’s.98 The Data Protection Directive adopted by the
European Commission in 1995 grants all European citizens a fundamental
right to control the collection, transmission, or use of personal information.99
On January 1, 2012, the EU’s Proposed General Data Protection Regulation
displaced the Data Protection Directive.100 The twenty-seven member states
of the European Union are signatories of the European Convention on
Human Rights,101 which guarantees respect for one’s “private and family
life, his home, and his correspondence,” subject to certain restrictions.102
The European Court of Human Rights has given this article a very broad
interpretation, making it functionally equivalent to a fundamental Europewide constitutional right.103

98

“After the Second World War, the countries of Europe banded together to develop communitywide legislation to protect individual human rights. The Council of Europe Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 1950 (ECHR) reflects a Europe-wide
movement to guarantee individual rights. The ECHR is a legal norm incorporated by reference into the
national legislation of each member state. Since the vast majority of European countries are civil code
jurisdictions, the ECHR is self-executing. . . . All final judgments of the European Court of Human
Rights are binding on the respondent states, and the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe
supervises the execution of the judgments.” Michael L. Rustad & Sandra R. Paulsson, Monitoring
Employee E-Mail and Internet Usage: Avoiding the Omniscient Electronic Sweatshop: Insights from
Europe, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 829, 871–72 (2005) (footnotes omitted).
99
Council Directive 95/46/EC, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC) (protecting individuals with regard to the
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data).
100
See Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Protection
of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data
(General Data Protection Regulation), COM (2012) 11 final (Jan. 25, 2012), available at http://eur-lex.
europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2012:0011:FIN:EN:PDF; see also Tanguy Van
Overstraeten & Alana Van Caenegem, EU—Update on the Proposed General Data Protection
Regulation, LINKLATERS (Nov. 26, 2012), http://www.linklaters.com/Publications/Publication
1403Newsletter/TMT-News-November-2012/Pages/EU%E2%80%93Update-proposed-General-DataProtection-Regulation.aspx (describing the timetable for adoption of proposed regulation).
101
“After the Second World War, the countries of Europe banded together to develop communitywide legislation to protect individual human rights. The Council of Europe Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 1950 (ECHR) reflects a Europe-wide
movement to guarantee individual rights.” Rustad & Paulsson, supra note 98, at 871.
102
Id. at 872. “The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of
1950, which is enforced by the European Court of Human Rights, is one of the most important
documents underlying the right to privacy. Individuals can file a complaint to this Court provided all
national remedies have been exhausted. During the last few decades European policymaker[s] have
discussed what comprises the private sphere.” Id. at 870–71 (footnote omitted) (discussing Article 8 of
the ECHR). “It is important to understand how the European Court of Human Rights and the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms work” in tandem to protect
privacy as a fundamental right. Id. at 871. “Most privacy-based legislation in Europe, including statutes
governing personal data, privacy, and protection of e-mails, has its genesis in the Council of Europe’s
Convention.” Id.
103
“Article 8 of the ECHR articulates a basic fundamental right to privacy embodied in the
constitutions of European countries, and grants all Europeans the fundamental right to have their
privacy respected.” Id. at 872 (footnote omitted).
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At a time when U.S. courts and legislatures are beating a hasty retreat
from expansive tort remedies,104 the European Union has adopted the
Product Liability Directive, which requires member states to adopt national
legislation. This Directive comes close to a constitutional right for all
European consumers.105 Shapo’s omission of a discussion of the Product
Liability Directive is surprising given that he was the first U.S. scholar to
compare U.S. law with the then-newly minted EU Directive.106 Many of the
chapters of Shapo’s book point to U.S. injury law as curbing abuses of
power, but it is the Europeans who have elevated consumer rights such as
product safety, privacy, and consumer protection to a quasi-constitutional
level.107
CONCLUSION
An Injury Law Constitution is a rich, textured, and nuanced study of
the connections between common law decisions, statutes, and alternative
compensation systems. If law schools were to adopt Shapo’s argument for
teaching these complex connections, they would have to increase the credit
hours, not reduce them.108 In his book, Shapo seeks a pathway between law,
economics, and philosophically oriented civil recourse theorists who are so
prominently featured in twenty-first century tort theory.109 Studying tort law
divorced from its relationship with safety regulations and alternative
compensation systems is like Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark.110 An
104

The American Law Institute’s RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY (1998)
proposes a products liability analysis that retreats from strict liability to negligence.
105
See Council Directive 85/374/EEC, on the Approximation of the Laws, Regulations and
Administrative Provisions of the Member States Concerning Liability for Defective Products, 1985 O.J.
(L 210) 29 (EC).
106
See Marshall S. Shapo, Comparing Products Liability: Concepts in European and American
Law, 26 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 279 (1993).
107
See, e.g., Council Directive 93/13/EEC, 1993 O.J. (L 95) 29 (EC).
108
The trend in American law schools is to reduce credits for torts. Yale Law School, for example,
teaches torts in a one-semester, four-credit course. Torts I: Group I, YALE L. SCH.,
http://ylsinfo.law.yale.edu/wsw/prereg/CourseDetails.asp?cClschedid=110924 (last visited May 24,
2013). Northwestern Law, where Shapo teaches, allocates only three credits to the basic torts course.
Torts, NW. L., http://www.law.northwestern.edu/curriculum/coursecatalog/details.cfm?CourseID=1118
(last visited May 24, 2013) (describing introductory torts course as a three-credit course); see also
Martha Chamallas, The Architecture of Bias: Deep Structures in Tort Law, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 463, 503
n.153 (1998) (noting that “many law schools have reduced torts from a six-credit, full-year course to a
three- or four-credit, one-semester course”); Lynn M. Daggett, Teaching Torts by Integrating Ethical,
Skills, Policy and Real-World Issues, and Using Varied Pedagogical Techniques: Reflections on Using
the Henderson, Pearson and Siliciano Casebook, 25 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 63, 63 (2001) (indicating that
torts credits were reduced from six to five for first-year students); John M. Griesbach, Teaching Torts:
Introduction, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 709, 713 (2001) (discussing “losses that have been suffered as credit
hours for the basic torts course have been reduced from six to five to four or fewer over the past
decades”).
109
See SHAPO, supra note 9, at 214–22.
110
See Rustad, supra note 32, at 498.
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Injury Law Constitution is a distinctively American theory with its
evocative analysis of the empowerment of ordinary citizens to redress
wrongs. Further research should investigate how the injury law constitution
of modern Europe, drawing from a very different cultural, philosophical,
and historical context, addresses emergent social problems.
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